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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 28, 2015, the owner of the Boston Bruins, Jeremy Jacobs, 
and his wife, Margaret Jacobs (collectively the “Boston Bruins”), were 
issued a Notice of Deficiency from the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”).1  Deeridge Farms Hockey Association, an S Corporation that 
Jeremy and Margaret are the “sole shareholders of,” “operates the Boston 
Bruins.”2  In the Notice of Deficiency, the IRS claimed that the Boston 
Bruins owe $45,205.00 for the 2009 tax year and $39,823.00 for the 2010 
tax year.3  Three months after receiving the Notice of Deficiency, the 
Boston Bruins filed a petition with the United States Tax Court 
challenging the IRS’s determination of deficiency.4 
The issue between the IRS and the Boston Bruins involves 
deductions that the team took for meal expenses.5  Specifically, the IRS 
claims that the meal expenses, which the team incurred by providing its 
players with meals during away games, are capped at fifty percent of the 
amount spent according to Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “Tax Code” 
or “Code”) Section 274(n).6  The Boston Bruins argue that the away game 
meal expenses are governed by Section 274(n)(2), which provides that 
the fifty percent limitation “does not apply in some circumstances, 
including when the meal expense is excludible as gross income of the 
recipient under the de minimis fringe rules of Section 132.”7 
The faceoff between the IRS and the Boston Bruins will require the 
court to address issues that have “remained unresolved for many years” 
 
 1  Br. for Pet’r at 1, Jacobs v. Comm’r., No. 19009-15 (T.C. July 27, 2015); see also 
Boston Bruins Owners’ Seek Redetermination of Tax Deficiencies, TAX NOTES TODAY 161-
13 (Aug. 20, 2015) (Lexis). 
 2  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5. 
 3  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 2. 
 4  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; see also Callum Borchers, Bruins, IRS in Face-Off on 
Deducting Team Meals, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe 
.com/business/2015/08/17/bruins-appeal-for-irs-approval-deduct-cost-feeding-team-during-
road-trips/IgfStOf0wBhWGtHr82aVjO/story.html. 
 5  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; see also Bruins in Tax Battle with IRS Over Comped 
Meals, FOX SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.foxsports.com/nhl/story/irs-boston-bruins-
tax-meal-write-offs-081815. 
 6  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; Roger Russell, Boston Bruins Battle IRS Over Meal 
Deductions, ACCT. TODAY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/tax-
practice/boston-bruins-battle-irs-over-meal-deductions-75542-1.html.  
 7  Andrew Velarde, News Analysis: Are the Bruins About to Hip-Check the IRS on Meal 
Expenses?, TAX NOTES TODAY 165-2 (Aug. 25, 2015) (Lexis); accord Br. for Pet’r, supra 
note 1, at 9; see also 26 I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B) (2016) (stating that the fifty percent cap does 
not apply if “in the case of an expense for food or beverages, such expense is excludable from 
the gross income of the recipient under section 132 by reason of subsection (e) thereof 
(relating to de minimis fringes) . . . “). 
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and could have a significant impact on businesses across the country.8  A 
favorable ruling for the Boston Bruins would be used as precedent by the 
“30 NHL teams and 30 NBA teams traveling for 41 games each season, 
32 NFL teams traveling eight times a season, and 30 MLB teams 
traveling for 81 games each year.”9  It would also affect employees of 
“mobile employers” who have not been deducting 100 percent of their 
meal expenses.10  Furthermore, if the court decides in favor of the Boston 
Bruins, then the IRS could lose millions of dollars in tax revenue.11 
This note will take the position that the Boston Bruins are correct in 
deducting 100 percent of the meal expenses incurred during away games.  
Part II of this note will provide a comprehensive road map.  This road 
map will highlight the relevant parts of the Tax Code that are applicable 
to the Boston Bruins argument and give insight into how these parts of 
the Tax Code function together.  Part III of this note will discuss what 
constitutes necessary and ordinary business expenses pursuant to Section 
162, and what must be shown by the taxpayer to meet the requirements 
of Section 162(a)(2) of the Code.  The first part of this section will apply 
the standards provided in Section 162 to the Boston Bruins’ case.  The 
next section of Part III will provide an in-depth exploration of Section 
274, which limits or denies Section 162 deductions for meals under 
certain circumstances.  During the discussion of the relevant elements of 
Section 274, this note will apply them to the present dispute between the 
Boston Bruins and the IRS.  Section 274, however, incorporates elements 
defined in other sections of the Tax Code, particularly Sections 132 and 
119.  These two sections of the Code will be discussed in Part IV.  The 
first section of Part IV will examine the definition of “meal” and “eating 
facility” in Section 132(e).  The second section of Part IV will present 
and analyze the historical background of Section 119, which provides an 
exclusion for the value of food provided to employees for the 
convenience of the employer on its business premises.  In the final 
segment of this note, Part V, will conclude that although the Boston 
Bruins face an uphill battle in their challenge of the IRS’s position, the 
team should ultimately be successful in their stated position.  Part V will 
also discuss the ramifications if the Boston Bruins are successful in their 
faceoff with the IRS. 
 
 8  Velarde, supra note 7. 
 9  Velarde, supra note 7. 
 10  Velarde, supra note 7 (stating that an example of an “mobile employer” would be a 
concert promoter who has a “group of mobile employees” that move from “venue to venue” 
promoting concerts). 
 11  Velarde, supra note 7. 
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II. THE GAME PLAN 
A. Tax Code Road Map 
The Tax Code “prescribes a complex and not-always-intuitive 
formula for navigating” the area of employer-provided meals.12  In order 
to decipher the argument asserted by the Boston Bruins and the relevant 
issues, it is important to understand how all of the applicable sections of 
the Tax Code work together.  To begin, Section 162(a) of the Tax Code 
allows for a taxpayer to deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business.”13  Section 162 explicitly treats “travel expenses (including 
amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are 
lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home in 
the pursuit of a trade or business” as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses.14 
Deductions for meals are, however, limited or denied in certain 
circumstances by Section 274, which applies once the elements of 
Section 162 are met.  Section 274(a)(1) disallows deductions “otherwise 
allowable under this chapter for any item” or activity that constitutes 
“entertainment, amusement, or recreation.”15  The section also applies to 
a “facility” that is used “in connection with an activity” that constitutes 
entertainment, amusement, or recreation.16  Though it is not clear on the 
face of Section 274 that meals are considered “entertainment, 
amusement, or recreation” the legislative history clearly indicates that it 
“includes any business expense incurred in furnishing of food and 
beverage.”17  There are, however, exceptions to the disallowance for 
“entertainment, amusement, or recreation” expenses.  The disallowance 
is not applicable if “the item was directly related to, or, in the case of an 
item directly preceding or following a substantial bona fide business 
discussion . . . associated with, the active conduct of the taxpayer’s trade 
or business.”18  The disallowance is also inapplicable in nine 
circumstances enumerated in Section 274(e) of the Tax Code.19  The two 
 
 12  Syd Gernstein, Boston Bruins Raise Controversy by Arguing that Meals are 
Deductible, Team is “World-Class,” BNA FED. TAX BLOG (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://www.bna.com 
/boston-bruins-raise-b17179934636/. 
 13  26 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2016). 
 14  I.R.C. § 162(a)(2). 
 15  I.R.C. § 274(a)(1) (2016). 
 16  I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(B). 
 17  S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 27 (1962). 
 18  26 I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (2016). 
 19  I.R.C. § 274(e). 
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most pertinent exceptions under Section 274(e) with respect to the Boston 
Bruins are the exceptions for “food and beverages for employees” and 
“employees, stockholder, etc., business meetings.”20  Even if one of the 
exceptions applies, expenses for business meals are often limited by 
Section 274(n) to fifty percent of the expense.21  The fifty percent 
limitation is not applicable if the “expense is excludable from the gross 
income of the recipient under Section 132 by reason of subsection (e) 
thereof (relating to de minimis fringes).”22 
Section 132 treats an eating facility as a de minimis fringe—a fringe 
benefit of such small value that it is excluded from taxation—if the 
employer operates the eating facility for the employees, the facility is 
“located on or near the business premises of the employer,” and the 
“revenue derived from such facility normally equals or exceeds the direct 
operating costs of such facility.”23  The requirement under Section 132 
that the revenue from the facility equals or exceeds the direct operating 
expenses is satisfied if the employees are permitted to exclude the value 
of the meal under Section 119.  Pursuant to Section 119, an employee 
may exclude from his gross income “the value of any meals or lodging 
furnished to him . . . on behalf of his employer” if the meals are provided 
for the convenience of the employer and “are furnished on the business 
premises of the employer.”24 
III. SCORING DEDUCTIONS 
A. Section 162: Ordinary and Necessary 
Before the Boston Bruins can assert that the away game meal 
expenses they incurred are 100 percent deductible under Section 274, the 
team must first meet the requirements of Section 162.  Section 162(a) 
allows for deductions of ordinary and necessary trade or business 
expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business.25  The courts, in lieu 
of offering a bright-line test for determining whether a business expense 
is necessary and ordinary, have offered an objective standard in which to 
 
 20  I.R.C. § 274(e)(1) (“Subsection (a) shall not apply to—[e]xpenses for food and 
beverages (and facilities used in connection therewith) furnished on the premises of the 
taxpayer primarily for his employees.”). 
 21  I.R.C. § 274(n) (stating in part that the deduction “shall not exceed 50 percent” for 
“any expense for food and beverages, and any item with respect to an activity which is of a 
type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, or with 
respect to a facility used in connection with such activity”).  
 22  I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B). 
 23  26 I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (2016). 
 24  26 I.R.C. § 119(a)(1)-(2) (2016). 
 25  I.R.C. § 162(a). 
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assess the nature of the expense.26  This test looks at whether a “hard-
headed businessman” would have incurred the same expense in an 
analogous situation.27 
The determination of whether a trade or business expense is ordinary 
will depend upon the “time and place and circumstances” in which the 
expense was incurred.28  Moreover, in Deputy v. Du Pont, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the “nature and scope” of the business is “extremely 
relevant” in determining whether an expense is ordinary.”29 
The Boston Bruins will be able to establish that meals provided to 
its players during away games are ordinary expenses under Section 
162(a).  Each season the team plays numerous games away from Boston: 
forty-one regular season games, four preseason games, and potentially 
several away playoff games.30  In order for these players to adequately 
perform and serve their employer’s business purpose, the players need to 
be provided proper food and beverages before the game.31  Without 
proper nutrition, the team risks its players encountering “glycogen 
depletion, hypoglycemia, and fatigue during exercise.”32  Considering the 
nature and scope of the Boston Bruins’ business—”playing and winning 
professional hockey games”—it is highly probable that the court will find 
no issue with classifying the away game meal expenses as ordinary.33 
For an expense to be classified as necessary under Section 162(a), 
the expense must be found to be “appropriate and helpful” and incurred 
with the intention of securing a business benefit.34  In the Boston Bruins’ 
 
 26  United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (stating that the Supreme Court focused on 
the “origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred . . . “ in 
deciding that legal fees that were incurred in a divorce action were not deductible). 
 27  General Bancshares Corp. v. Comm’r, 326 F.2d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1964); see also 
Rittenberg v. U.S., 267 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 28  Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940) (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 
111, 113-14 (1933)). 
 29  Id.  (“The fact that an obligation to pay has arisen is not sufficient.  It is the kind of 
transaction out of which the obligation arose and its normalcy in the particular business which 
are crucial and controlling.”); see also Larrabee v. Comm’r., 33 T.C. 838, 843 (1960) (finding 
that the petitioners were not allowed to deduct the operating expenses of a yacht because there 
was a lack of proximate relationship between the expense and the business operations of the 
petitioners). 
 30  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5. 
 31  See Fueling for Performance: How Proper Timing of Meals Affects Both Sport and 
Academic Performance, NCAA (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-
safety/nutrition-and-performance/fueling-performance-how-proper-timing-meals-affects-
both. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7. 
 34  Boyd v. Comm’r., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1253, at *2 (2002) (citing Welch v. Helvering, 
290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)); Heigerick v. Comm’r., 45 T.C. 475, 478 (1966). 
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case, the team meets both requirements for the expense to be considered 
necessary under Section 162(a).  The Boston Bruins engage in the 
business of being “a world-class hockey team that provides entertainment 
to hockey fans who watch the Bruins’ games,” entertainment which is 
sold to the fans “as part of a bona fide transaction.”35  Furthermore, the 
team’s entertainment goals, including their “ultimate purpose of playing, 
and winning, professional hockey games,” can only be accomplished by 
providing the players’ necessary meals.36  In sports, especially 
professional sports, “adequate nutrition is absolutely essential for optimal 
training and performance of the athlete.”37  These “carefully selected” 
meals that “meet specific nutritional guidelines” can optimize 
“performance consistency in competition” and “reduce[] risk of injury” 
to the athletes.38  Thus, the Bruins will have no issue proving that the 
away game meals qualify as necessary for the purposes of Section 162(a). 
Although the Bruins meet the necessary and ordinary test, the team 
may also be able to deduct its meal expenses under Section 162(a)(2).39  
To come within the purview of Section 162(a)(2), the taxpayer must clear 
three hurdles.40  Specifically, the taxpayer must establish the expense 
was: (1) “reasonable and necessary,” (2) “incurred while away from 
home,” and (3) “incurred in the pursuit of a trade or business.”41 
The first prong will be met if the travel expenses are solely for 
business, and “reasonable and necessary.”42  This includes “meals and 
lodging,” “travel fare,” and other “expenses incident to travel.”43  
Moreover, the determination of whether a trip is “related primarily to the 
taxpayer’s trade or business” will depend on the “facts and circumstances 
in each case.”44 
As to the second prong, the IRS and the courts have decided that the 
 
 35  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5. 
 36  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7. 
 37  Katherine A. Beals & Anna Mitchell, Recent Recommendations and Current 
Controversies in Sport Nutrition, 9 AM. J. LIFESTYLE MED. 288, 288 (2013). 
 38  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8; Beals & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 288. 
 39  26 I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2016) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary 
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business, including—(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and 
lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while 
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business . . . .”). 
 40  Daly v. Comm’r., 72 T.C. 190, 194 (1979) (citing Comm’r. v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 
470 (1946)); I.R.C. § 162(a). 
 41  Daly, 72 T.C. at 194. 
 42  Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (2016). 
 43  Id. 
 44  Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2). 
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taxpayer must meet the “overnight rule.”45  This requires the taxpayer to 
show that the trip (1) “requir[ed] sleep or rest,” (2) the sleep or rest “was 
substantial in time,” and (3) the trip was away from home.46 
Finally, the last requirement is that the expense be “incurred in the 
pursuit of a trade or business.”47  Whether this element is met requires the 
court to examine the facts and circumstances of each case.48 
The Boston Bruins will be able to meet the aforementioned test for 
the deduction of business expenses under Section 162(a)(2) of the Code.  
As to the first prong, the Boston Bruins incurred the meal expenses at 
hotels solely because of the business the team is involved in.49  The team 
would not be able to function if it did not travel for its games because 
failure to attend away games would cause the Boston Bruins to miss half 
of its games.50  Thus, the team traveling to an away game is solely for 
business reasons. 
Turning to the second prong of Section 162(a)(2), the taxpayer needs 
to meet the overnight rule by showing that he is away from his principal 
place of business.  The team meets the overnight rule because “the players 
are required to sleep at the designated hotel and abide by a designated 
curfew.”51  The team will also be able to establish that Boston is the 
principal location of the business pursuant to the factors provided by the 
IRS.52  The fact that the team plays half of its games at its home arena 
and that the corporate headquarters is located at the home arena is enough 
for the Boston Bruins to show that Boston is the team’s principal business 
location.53  This conclusion is further supported by the fact that when the 
 
 45  Chappie v. Comm’r., 73 T.C. 823, 830 (1980) (“It is well settled that ‘away from 
home’ includes only overnight trips or trips which a stop for sleep or rest is required.”  (citing 
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967))). 
 46  Id.; Siragusa v.  Comm’r., 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1196, at 11-12 (1980) (stating that rest 
or sleep is substantial in time if it requires the taxpayer to secure lodging and is not “a mere 
pause in the daily work”); Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60 (stating that the term “home” 
has been defined by the IRS as the “place at which the taxpayer conducts the trade or 
business”); see generally Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51 (The IRS has provided factors 
that should be considered when determining if the location is the taxpayer’s principal place 
of business, which are: (1) “total time ordinarily spent by the taxpayer at each of his business 
posts,” (2) “the degree of business activity at each such post,” and (3) “whether the financial 
return in respect of each post is significant or insignificant.”). 
 47  Daly, 72 T.C. 190 at 194. 
 48  Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941). 
 49  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6. 
 50  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5. 
 51  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6. 
 52  Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51. 
 53  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5; BOSTON BRUINS, http://bruins.nhl.com/club/ 
page.htm?id=38742 (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016) (stating the Boston Bruins’ home arena is 
TD Garden in Boston). 
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court and the IRS were faced with a situation where an athlete was trying 
to deduct his expenses under Section 162(a)(2), both the IRS and court 
found that the “tax home of the athlete was the principal place of his 
employment or business (i.e., the city where his team is located).”54  If 
the athlete’s principal place of business is the city of the team in which 
he plays for, then it would seem likely that the team’s principal place of 
business is the city where it is located—Boston in this case. 
The last requirement that needs to be met by a taxpayer under 
Section 162(a)(2) is that the expense was incurred in the pursuit of a trade 
or business.  This will be satisfied by the fact that the only reason the 
team is traveling and incurring meal expenses is because it has to play 
against another team, which is an essential element of its business of 
providing hockey entertainment to fans of the sport.55 
B. Section 274 
i. Historical Overview 
In the early 1960s, prior to the implementation of Section 274, 
Congress became concerned about abusive deductions for meals and 
entertainment.56 
In 1961, President Kennedy suggested to Congress that “business 
entertainment and the maintenance of entertainment facilities” be 
disallowed entirely as tax deductions, and that “restrictions should be 
imposed on the deductibility of business gifts and travel expenses.”57  
Congress did not think that a complete disallowance in all circumstances 
was the proper solution.58  Rather, it added a complex provision to IRC 
Section 274, which disallows deductions for meals in certain 
circumstances, limits the deductions to fifty percent in most cases, and 
allows deductions without limitation in other cases.59  The IRS maintains 
that the fifty percent limitation applies to the Boston Bruins.60  The team 
 
 54  Bailey v. Comm’r., 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 141, at 5, 9 (1984) (The taxpayer was a hockey 
player who played in St. Louis in 1973 and was traded to Detroit in 1974.  The Court held 
that the player’s tax home was “Detroit and St. Louis, respectively, during the periods of time 
petitioner resided in those cities.”); see also Wills v. Comm’r., 411 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 
1969) (holding the athlete’s tax home was Los Angeles during the time he played for the Los 
Angeles Dodgers); see generally Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51. 
 55  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5. 
 56  MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 133 
(12th ed. 2012); see also S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 25 (1962). 
 57  H.R. REP. NO. 82-1447, at 19 (1962). 
 58  S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 25 (1962). 
 59  26 I.R.C. § 274 (2016); I.R.S. Publication 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift and Car 
Expenses, at 11-12, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p463.pdf. 
 60  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; Roger Russell, Boston Bruins Battle IRS Over Meal 
ADAM SUCKNO.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2017  12:18 PM 
216 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 41:1 
claims that the expenses are fully deductible.61 
ii. Analysis and Application of Section 274 
The provisions of Section 274 are of “stupefying complexity.”62  
Section 274(a) generally disallows a deduction for any expenses incurred 
by the taxpayer which constitute “entertainment, amusement, or 
recreation” unless such expense is “directly related to” or “associated 
with” the “active conduct of the taxpayer’s trade or business . . . .”63  
Alternatively, if the taxpayer cannot satisfy the “associated with” or the 
“directly related” tests of Section 274(a), then the taxpayer may be able 
to show that his business expenses fall under one of the nine exceptions 
enumerated in Section 274(e).64  Even if a taxpayer meets the directly 
related or associated with tests of Section 274(a), or if the taxpayer’s 
situation falls under one of the exceptions provided in 274(e), Section 
274(n) caps the expense deductible by a taxpayer for meals and 
entertainment at fifty percent of the cost of the expense.65  This fifty 
percent limitation applies unless the meal or entertainment expense falls 
under one of the five exceptions listed under Section 274(n)(2).66 
IRC Section 274, which deals with “entertainment, amusement, or 
recreation,” might not seem applicable to meals provided by the Boston 
Bruins to players and staff while on the road, but the Senate Report 
explicitly states that entertainment “includes any business expense 
incurred in furnishing of food and beverages.”67  The General 
Explanation of the provision prepared by the staff of the Committee on 
Taxation states that “allowable deductions for business meals[] includ[e] 
meals while on a business trip away from home, meals furnished on the 
employer’s business premises to its employees, and meal expense at a 
business luncheon club or a convention . . . .”68  Courts have uniformly 
read Section 274 to apply to all business meals.69  Treasury Regulations 
 
Deductions, ACCT. TODAY (Sept. 25, 2016), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/ 
tax-practice/boston-bruins-battle-irs-over-meal-deductions-75542-1.html. 
 61  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9. 
 62  DANIEL Q. POSIN & DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS 400 (7th ed. 2005). 
 63  26 I.R.C. § 274(a) (2016). 
 64  I.R.C. § 274(a), (e). 
 65  I.R.C. § 274(n). 
 66  I.R.C. § 274(n)(2). 
 67  I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A); S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 27 (1962). 
 68  STAFF OF THE COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 61 (Comm. Print 1987) available at http://www.jct.gov/jcs-10-
87.pdf. 
 69  Howard v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1554 (1981) (“We find that the deduction [for 
the luncheon] is not disallowed by section 274(a) because it falls within the exception to that 
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(“Regulations”) indicate that IRC Section 274 applies to meals provided 
to employees.70 
IRC Section 274(a) establishes two different tests that a taxpayer can 
meet for the expense to be deductible: the “associated with” and the 
“directly related” tests, which require the taxpayer to go beyond the 
necessary and ordinary requirements of Section 162.71  These tests 
require a taxpayer to show a “greater degree of proximate relation” 
between his business and the expense.72  However, the taxpayer need only 
meet one of these tests.73 
 a. Directly Related Tests (“Active Business  
    Discussion” and “Clear Business Setting” Tests) 
Under the directly related test, an expense will be considered 
“directly related to the active conduct of the taxpayer’s trade of business” 
if the taxpayer can meet one of the four tests provided by the Treasury 
Regulations.74  Only two of these four tests will be discussed—the “active 
business discussion” test and the “clear business setting” test.75  The two 
other tests enumerated under the directly related test have no application 
to the issues raised by the Boston Bruins.76  Moreover, from the facts 
asserted in the Boston Bruins’ brief, the team will be able to meet either 
the active business discussion or the clear business setting test in order to 
satisfy the directly related test under IRC Section 274(a)77 
 
section contained in section 274(e)(1) for business meals furnished under circumstances 
conducive to business discussions.”); Baltran v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 892 (1982) (“The 
deductions we have allowed qualify for the most part as business meals under section 
274(e)(1), and we are therefore exempt from the limitations on deductibility contained in 
section 274(a).”); Lennon v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 751 (1978) (“Section 274(e) 
specifically provides that section 274(a) does not apply to ‘business meals.’  Instead, section 
274(e) provides that if the taxpayer can establish that a ‘business meal’ was furnished in 
surroundings generally conducive to a business discussion, the taxpayer need not establish 
that the meal was ‘directly related’ to the conduct of his trade or business.”). 
 70  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(ii) (2016). 
 71  26 I.R.C. § 274(a) (2016). 
 72  Daniel Candee Knickerbocker, Jr., Entertainment and Related Deductions Under the 
Revenue Act of 1962, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 642 (1963). 
 73  See POSIN &. TOBIN, supra note 62, at 402 (“[T]he taxpayer establishes that the item 
was directly related to—or . . . associated with—the active conduct of a taxpayer’s trade or 
business.”) (emphasis added). 
 74  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(2). 
 75  See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(5) (2016) (discussing the treatment of entertainment 
expenses when the expense benefits an individual, who is not an employee); see also Treas. 
Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(6) (elaborating on the furnishing of food and beverages, which were 
incurred prior to 1994). 
 76  See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(5)-(6). 
 77  See Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1. 
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           1. Active Business Discussion 
There are four requirements that must be demonstrated in order to 
meet the active business discussion test, which in turn means the taxpayer 
will meet the directly related test.78  First, when the taxpayer made “the 
entertainment expenditure . . . , the taxpayer had more than a general 
expectation of deriving some income or other specific trade or business 
benefit at some indefinite future time.”79  With respect to the Boston 
Bruins, the team had more than a general expectation of deriving both a 
benefit and income from the expenditure for pre-game meals.  The 
success of the Boston Bruins’ business is completely dependent on the 
performance of the players; thus, it is important that these players are 
provided the proper nutrition.80  The benefit that the Bruins receive from 
the two meals provided to players on game days is twofold.  First, the 
pre-game meals allow the team to “control the players’ movement up 
until game time,” and they allow coaches and the press to speak to the 
players during the meals.81  Second, the pre-game meals “are carefully 
selected by the club’s professional medical staff to meet specific nutrition 
guidelines.”82  These meals are “heavy on carbohydrates and come in 
large portions, and the team dictates exactly what proteins, fruits, and 
vegetables must be available.”83  Therefore, it is evident that the Boston 
Bruins have more than a general expectation of deriving both a benefit 
and income from the meal expense—it is absolutely essential that their 
players are provided food with high nutritional value to ensure the 
success of the Boston Bruins’ business. 
Second, it must be shown that during the time the expense was 
incurred, “the taxpayer actively engaged in a business meeting, 
negotiation, discussion, or bona fide business transaction, other than 
entertainment, for the purpose of obtaining” a business benefit or 
 
 78  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3). 
 79  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(i) (stating that there is no requirement that the taxpayer 
show that every expense resulted in income or a business benefit). 
 80  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; see generally Helen DeMarco, Pre-Event Meals, AM. 
COLL. OF SPORTS MED., https://www.acsm.org/docs/current-comments/preevent 
meals.pdf (last accessed Oct. 31, 2016) (“It is well established that exercise performance can 
be affected by diet and, in order to maintain optimal training, the body must be properly 
refueled with appropriate nutrients.”). 
 81  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 82  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 83  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. Cf. Helen DeMarco, Pre-Event Meals, AM. COLL. OF 
SPORTS MED., http://www.acsm.org/docs/current-comments/preeventmeals.pdf (last accessed 
Oct. 31, 2016) (Proper meals, especially those that are high in carbohydrates, are essential to 
preventing athletes from experiencing “weakness and fatigue . . . , ward off feelings of hunger 
yet minimize gastrointestinal distress from eating . . . , guarantee optimal hydration”, and 
“delay fatigue.”). 
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income.84  It is undisputed that the Boston Bruins can meet this prong 
because during these meals “coaches and press staff speak with players 
individually to prepare them for the upcoming game, an interview with 
the media, or some similar event.”85 
The third prong under the active business discussion test looks at the 
facts and circumstances of the expenditure and determines if the principal 
character of the “combined business and entertainment” expense was the 
active conduct of the taxpayer’s business.86  The facts of the Boston 
Bruins case unambiguously demonstrate that these pre-game meals had 
the principal characteristic of being for a business purpose; the meals 
provide the players with proper nutrition prior to the game and an 
opportunity for players to speak with coaches and the media.87  Moreover, 
the meals serve to protect the Boston Bruins’ business interest of 
providing entertainment to fans by allowing the team to “control the 
players’ movement and conduct up until the game.”88 
The fourth and final condition that needs to be met under the active 
business discussion test is the disallowance of nonbusiness guests.89  In 
essence, the expenditure must be allocable at the time it was incurred to 
the “taxpayer and a person with whom the taxpayer engaged in the active 
conduct of trade or business during the entertainment.”90  The pre-game 
meals furnished to the players are exclusively available to the “club’s 
entire hockey operation staff.”91  This hockey operation staff consists of 
“twenty-two hockey players plus the general manager, various coaches, 
medical trainers, equipment managers, public relations staff, and logistic 
managers.”92  As a result, the meal expenses are directly attributable to 
the team and its essential operation staff.  Thus, the active business 
 
 84  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(ii) (2016); see D.A. Foster Trenching Co. v. United States, 
473 F.2d 1398, 1403 (1973) (stating that during the business meeting or bona fide business 
transaction the taxpayer or a representative of the taxpayer, such as the taxpayer’s employee, 
must be present when the expense occurs). 
 85  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 86  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(iii); see generally Townsend Indus. v. United States, 342 
F.3d 890, 891 (8th Cir. 2003).  A company had its sales people attend a “two-day meeting at 
its headquarters,” which involved “corporate staff and some factory workers.”  After this 
meeting the company sponsored a fishing trip that lasted four days, during which the CEO 
spoke about the company and the employees and sales people were free to do whatever they 
pleased.  The Court held that the third prong was met because this trip enabled the company 
to introduce new products and for “the national sales team to interact with the” manufacturing 
employees of the company.  Id. 
 87  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 88  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 89  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(iv) (2016). 
 90  Id. 
 91  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 92  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
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discussion test is satisfied. 
           2. Clear Business Setting 
The second test available to a taxpayer under the directly related test 
is the clear business setting test.93  An entertainment expense will be 
considered directly related to the taxpayer’s trade or business if the 
taxpayer can establish that the expense occurred “in a clear business 
setting directly in further[ance] of the taxpayer’s trade or business.”94  
This can be established by the taxpayer demonstrating that “any recipient 
of the entertainment would have reasonably known that the taxpayer had 
no significant motive, in incurring the expenditure, other than directly 
furthering his trade or business,” which is determined by objective 
standards.95 
The Boston Bruins will be able to establish that the meal expenses 
occurred in a clear business setting.  The team will be able to demonstrate 
that the players reasonably knew that the team was incurring the meal 
expenses in order to further the team’s business objectives.  For example, 
the meals are specifically chosen with the intent of enhancing the players’ 
performance; the players must meet with coaches and the press during 
the meals, and the meals ensure that the team has control over the players 
prior to the game.96  These aforementioned examples would lead a 
reasonable player to believe that the meals were provided to further the 
team’s business. 
 b. “Associated With” Test 
The second test under 274(a) is the associated with test.97  This test 
requires that a taxpayer have “a clear business purpose in making the 
expenditure, such as to obtain new business or to encourage the 
continuation of an existing business relationship,” and that the 
“entertainment directly preceded or followed a substantial and bona fide 
business discussion.”98  The test operates with the intent of allowing 
deductions for business entertainment expenses “incurred primarily for 
the purpose of fostering goodwill.”99  However, this test is not applicable 
to the Boston Bruins’ case because the meal expenses that the team incurs 
are directly related to the Boston Bruins’ business. 
 
 93  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(4) (2016). 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 97  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d). 
 98  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d)(1), (2). 
 99  6 MERTENS, LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX’N § 25D.27 (2016). 
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 c. 274(e) Exceptions 
Although the Boston Bruins meet the directly related test under 
Section 274(a), meeting this test may not be necessary because of the 
exceptions listed in 274(e).  IRC Section 274(e) lists nine situations that 
allow a taxpayer to bypass the associated with and directly related tests 
of Section 274(a).100  Two of these exceptions are directly applicable to 
the Boston Bruins: Section 274(e)(1) (food and beverages for employees) 
and Section 274(e)(5) (employees, stockholder, etc., business 
meetings).101  Pursuant to Section 274(e)(1), expenses incurred for food 
and beverages “furnished on the taxpayer’s business premises primarily 
for his employees” will be exempted from the “directly related” test.102  
This expectation will apply not only when the expense is incurred for 
furnishing food and beverages to the employees “in a typical cafeteria or 
an executive dining room, but also to expenditures with respect to the 
operation of those facilities.”103  Applying this exception to the Boston 
Bruins creates a major issue: whether the away game hotels, where the 
meals are provided, constitute the business premises of the Boston 
Bruins.  What constitutes the business premises of the employer will be 
addressed in section IV of this note.104 
Despite the fact that the Boston Bruins are able to satisfy either the 
directly related test under Section 274(a) or establish that their 
circumstances fall under one of the exceptions enumerated in Section 
274(e), the team may still be restricted to only deducting fifty percent of 
the total meal costs incurred.  Under Section 274(n), any food or beverage 
expense incurred by the taxpayer will be deductible only up to fifty 
percent of the cost for the food or beverage, unless an exception 
applies.105  Section 274(n)(2) states that the fifty percent cap on food and 
beverage costs “shall not apply to any expense if” the expense for food 
and beverages is “excludable from the gross income of the recipient under 
Section 132 by reason of subsection (e) thereof (relating to de minimis 
 
 100  26 I.R.C. § 274(e) (2016). 
 101  I.R.C. § 274(e)(1), (5); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(vi) (Section 274(e)(5) allows for 
“any expenditure by a taxpayer for entertainment which is directly related to bona fide 
business meetings of the taxpayer’s employees, stockholders, agents, or directors held 
principally for discussion of trade or business . . . .”); MERTENS, supra note 99, § 25D.31 
(stating that the 274(e)(5) exception “applies to business meeting where some social activities 
are provided, it is not intended to apply to gatherings which are primary for social 
purposes . . .”).  But see 26 I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(A) (2016).  The 274(e)(5) exception will not 
help the Boston Bruins, because it is still subject to the fifty percent limitation of 274(n).  Id. 
 102  Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(ii). 
 103  MERTENS, supra note 99, § 25D.31. 
 104  See infra Part IV.B.2.ii (discussing the meaning of business premise under IRC 
Section 119). 
 105  26 I.R.C. § 274(n) (2016). 
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fringes).”106  The requirements that need to be satisfied in order for a cost 
to be a de minimis fringe benefit and thus fall under the exception to the 
fifty percent cap will be discussed in the following section. 
IV. THE FACEOFF 
A. Section 132 
Section 132(a) provides, “Gross income shall not include any fringe 
benefit which qualifies as a . . . de minimis fringe.”107  An employer-
operated eating facility will “be treated as de minimis if—(A) such 
facility is located on or near the business premises of the employer, and 
(B) revenue derived from such facility normally equals or exceeds the 
direct operating costs of such facility.”108  If an employee is permitted to 
exclude the value of the meal under Section 119, then the “value of a meal 
provided at an ‘eating facility’ will be treated as having paid an amount 
equal to the facility’s direct operating cost attributable to the meal.”109  In 
other words, if the consumer of the meal is not required to include the 
value of the meal in his gross income, then the consumer will be treated 
as if he paid a value for the meal that is equal to the costs the employer 
incurred in operating the eating facility.  This requirement will be 
discussed in further detail in the next section of this note under Section 
119. 
Neither the Tax Code nor the Treasury Regulations provide a 
definition of what constitutes an “eating facility.”110  However, a Chief 
Counsel Advice Memoranda does give some insight into what constitutes 
an eating facility under Section 132(e)(2).111  The Office of Chief Counsel 
held that crewmembers of a commercial airline could not exclude the cost 
of the meals provided to them while in flight from their gross income 
under Section 132(e) because the airplane does not constitute an eating 
 
 106  I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B). 
 107  26 I.R.C. § 132(a)(4) (2016) (Section 132(e) provides that the term de minimis fringe 
means “any property or service the value of which is (after taking into account the frequency 
with which similar fringes are provided by the employer to the employer’s employees) so 
small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”). 
 108  I.R.C. § 132(e). 
 109  Velarde, supra note 7, at 2. 
 110  Velarde, supra note 7, at 2. 
 111  Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2011-51-020 (Aug. 31, 2011); see generally Treas. Reg. § 
1.132-7(b)(2)(ii) (2016) (“The cost of labor for personnel whose service relating to the facility 
are performed primarily on the premises of the eating facility . . . the labor costs attributable 
to cooks, waiters, and waitresses are included in direct operating costs, but the labor costs 
attributable to a manager of an eating facility whose services relating to the facility are not 
primarily performed on the premises of the earing facility is not included in the direct 
operating costs.”).  
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facility pursuant to Section 132(e)(2).112  Eating facility, according to the 
Office of Chief Counsel, “means an identifiable location that is 
designated for the preparation and/or consumption of meals,” such as a 
cafeteria or dining room.113  Furthermore, the Treasury Regulations 
“contemplate that an eating facility is a location at which individuals are 
employed to prepare and/or serve food.”114  The hotels where the team 
stays satisfy the Office of Chief Counsel and the Regulation’s definition 
of eating facility because the team contracts with the away city hotel to 
provide an identifiable place where the meals will be provided, and the 
team sends a “tightly designed menu” to the hotel’s catering staff to 
prepare for the team.115 
For an eating facility to qualify as an “employer-operated eating 
facility” under Section 132, the Code requires that it be “located on or 
near the business premises of the employer” and that the revenue from 
the facility equals or exceeds the operating costs of the facility.116  The 
Regulations provide four additional conditions: 
(i) [t]he facility is owned or leased by the employer, (ii) [t]he 
facility is operated by the employer, (iii) [t]he facility is 
located on or near the business premises of the employer, and 
(iv) [t]he meals furnished at the facility are provided during, 
or immediately before or after, the employee’s work day.117 
In section (III)(B)(2)(ii), this note will discuss the Section 132 
requirement that the facility be located on or near the business premises 
of the employer and the meaning of “business premises” under 274(e)(1).  
With respect to the first element required by the Treasury Regulations, 
the Boston Bruins should be able to establish that the team leases the 
hotel’s eating facility.  When the Boston Bruins travel for away games, 
the team enters into a formal memorialized letter “or other agreement 
with each hotel” which enables the Bruins to establish “a base of 
operations at a local hotel.”118  Pursuant to this agreement, the Boston 
Bruins pay the hotel an agreed upon amount in exchange for extensive 
use of the hotel space.119  Moreover, the Boston Bruins enter into a 
contract with “each away city hotel for the provision of a space where the 
meals will be provided and for the meals themselves.”120  The team also 
enters into a contract regarding what food will be served in the dining 
 
 112  Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2011-51-020 (Aug. 31, 2011). 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 116  26 I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)(A)-(B) (2016). 
 117  Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(2) (2016). 
 118  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6. 
 119  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6. 
 120  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
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area.121  This “tightly designed menu” is sent to the “hotel catering 
service” prior to the teams arrival and “dictates exactly what proteins, 
fruits, and vegetables must be available.”122  Moreover, the time spent at 
the hotel during this short-term lease is substantial.123  The amount of 
business conducted during “60 minutes of ice time” for each game pales 
in comparison to the substantial amount of business conducted at the 
hotel during the short-term lease.124  The Treasury Regulations further 
require that “the facility is operated by the employer.”125  However, the 
Regulations allow an employer to enter into an agreement “with another 
to operate an eating facility for its employees.”126  Therefore, since the 
Boston Bruins enter into a contract with the hotel’s catering service that 
explicitly states what food shall be provided to the players, the Boston 
Bruins will be able to meet this requirement of the Treasury Regulations.  
The final requirement pursuant to the Treasury Regulations provides that 
the meal must be served at the facility “during, or immediately before or 
after, the employee’s work day.”127  Once again, the Boston Bruins will 
be able to meet this requirement with ease. During the pregame meals, 
the players are required to speak with coaches and the media about the 
upcoming game.128  Furthermore, the coaches “hold a roll call at meals to 
ensure that all the players are in attendance, ready to participate in any 
meetings, and ready to head to the arena on time.”129  Immediately after 
eating and meeting with the coaches to discuss the game plan, the 
“players are taken to the visiting arena for practice or pre-game 
warmups.”130  Since the meals are provided right before the team heads 
to the away arena, the Boston Bruins will be able to meet the last 
requirement of the Treasury Regulations. 
B. Section 119 
To avoid the fifty percent limitation on deductions for meal 
expenses, IRC Section 132(e) requires that the employees be able to 
exclude the value of the meals from their income under Section 119.131 
 
 121  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 122  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 123  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7. 
 124  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7. 
 125  Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(2)(ii) (2016). 
 126  Treas. Reg. § 1.232-7(a)(3). 
 127  Treas. Reg. § 1.232-7(a)(2)(iv). 
 128  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 129  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 130  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 131  I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)(B) (2016). 
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i. Historical Overview 
Congress enacted Section 119 to “end the confusion as to the tax 
status of meals and lodging furnished to an employee by his employer.”132  
This confusion resulted from the courts and the IRS asserting different 
views of when lodging or meals provided by an employer to an employee 
should be includible to the employee’s gross income.133  Most of the 
confusion regarding when a situation constitutes the convenience of the 
employer has subsided; however, there is still considerable confusion 
about what constitutes the business premise of the employer.134  The 
confusion that persists today can be traced back to the legislative history 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1964.  Originally, the House provided 
that “[u]nder Section 119, if meals or lodging (1) are furnished at the 
place of employment, and (2) are required to be accepted by the employee 
at the place of employment, the value thereof shall be excluded from 
gross income . . . .” 135  However, once the Senate received the bill, the 
Senate amended critical terms of the bill.136 
The House bill provided that there shall be excluded from the gross 
income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished by 
the employer . . . but only if such meals or lodging are furnished at the 
place of employment . . . The Senate amendment provides that meals or 
lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer are excluded, but 
only if (1) such meals are furnished on the business premises of the 
employer . . . The term ‘business premises of the employer’ is intended 
in general, to have the same effect as the term ‘place of employment’ in 
the House bill.  For example, lodging furnished in the home to a domestic 
servant would be considered lodging furnished on the business premises 
of the employer. Similarly, meals furnished to a cowhand while herding 
his employer’s cattle on leased lands, or on national forest lands used 
under a permit, would also be regarded as furnished on the business 
premises of the employer.137 
This slight change in words from “place of employment” to 
“business premise of employer” serves as the foundation of the 
disagreement between the IRS and the Boston Bruins.138 
 
 132  S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 19 (1954). 
 133  See generally id.; H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A39 (1954).  
 134  See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (2015); see infra Part IV.B.2.ii. 
 135  H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A39 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 136  See generally S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 19 (1954). 
 137  H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543, at 26 (1954) (Conf. Rep.). 
 138  Velarde, supra note 7. 
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ii. Application and Analysis of Section 119 
 a. Convenience of the Employer 
As mentioned above, the Boston Bruins are allowed to deduct 100 
percent of the cost of meals under IRC Section 274(n)(2) only if the meal 
expense is a de minimis fringe under Section 132(e).139  Furthermore, 
Section 132(e) requires that the cost of operating the eating facility equals 
the revenue generated by it, which will be satisfied if the employee can 
exclude the value of the meal from his gross income under Section 119.140  
Pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.119(a), an employee may 
exclude the value of the meal provided by the employer from his gross 
income if the meal is furnished “on behalf of his employer for the 
convenience of the employer” and “on the business premises of the 
employer.”141 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) provides that for 
meals, the convenience of the employer test will be met if the meals are 
furnished in kind for a “substantial noncompensatory business reason.”142  
Moreover, the determination of the reason why the employer is providing 
meals will not be satisfied by the “mere declaration that the meals are 
furnished for the convenience of the employer.”143  Rather, the 
determination will be strictly based “upon an examination of all the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.”144  The Treasury Regulations do 
provide some general examples of when a meal will constitute for the 
convenience of the employer, such as when the employee needs to be 
available for emergencies, when the employee only has a short time 
period to eat because of the nature of his employers business, and when 
there are a lack of eating facilities available to the employee.145 
There has been a considerable relaxation in the interpretation of the 
convenience of the employer test by the courts, which is illustrated by the 
Tax Court’s decision in Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner and the 
subsequent reversal by the Ninth Circuit.  In Boyd Gaming Corp., the 
petitioners operated a casino where they provided food in their cafeteria 
to their employees without a charge.146  The petitioners took the same 
position as the Boston Bruins, asserting that they should be able to deduct 
 
 139  26 I.R.C. § 274(n)(2) (2016). 
 140  26 I.R.C. § 132(e) (2016). 
 141  26 I.R.C. § 119(a) (2016). 
 142  Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (2016). 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(a)-(c) (2016). 
 146  Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r., 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 759, at *3 (1997). 
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100 percent of the meals as a de minimis fringe under Section 
274(n)(2).147  The issue in this case was whether the meals were provided 
for the convenience of the employer.  During the course of this case, the 
petitioners argued that they met the convenience of the employer test 
because of their “stay on the premise” policy, which required their 
employees to remain on the business premises during working hours for 
security reasons.148  The Tax Court was not convinced that this policy 
was sufficient to meet the convenience of the employer test.149  In coming 
to this conclusion, the Court reasoned that there has to be a closer nexus 
between “the necessities of the employer’s business and the furnishing of 
free meals.”150  Essentially, the Tax Court took a business necessity 
theory approach to the convenience of the employer test, which allows an 
exclusion of the value of a meal from gross income only “when the 
employee must accept the meal ‘in order properly to perform his 
duties.’”151 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different position on the 
convenience of the employer test.  The Ninth Circuit held that a genuine 
policy that is enforced by the employer is sufficient to qualify as a 
substantially noncompensatory reason under the convenience of the 
employer test.152  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “captive” 
employees “had no choice but to eat on the premises” and “the furnished 
meals here were, in effect, ‘indispensable to the proper discharge’ of the 
employees’ duties.”153  The IRS acquiesced in this decision.154  
Furthermore, the IRS stated that it “will not attempt to substitute its 
judgment for the business decisions of an employer as to what specific 
business policies and practices are best suited to addressing the 
employer’s business concerns.”155  However, the IRS added that in 
determining if a meal was provided for the convenience of the employer, 
it would consider “whether the policies decided upon by the employer are 
reasonably related to the needs of the employer’s business . . . and 
whether these policies are in fact followed in the actual conduct of 
business.”156 
In light of this interpretation, the Boston Bruins will be able to 
 
 147  Id. at *16. 
 148  Id. at *11. 
 149  Id. at *26. 
 150  Id.  
 151  Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r., 177 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 152  Id. at 1101. 
 153  Id.  
 154  I.R.S. Announcement 99-77, 1999-32 I.R.B. 3 (Aug. 9, 1999). 
 155  Id. at 2.  
 156  Id. 
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satisfy the convenience of the employer test.  The Boston Bruins have 
two reasons for providing players with mandatory meals prior to an away 
game and neither of these justifications has a compensatory business 
reason.  First, the mandatory meals allow the team to have complete 
control over the players prior to the game.157  The team can control 
exactly what the player is putting into his body to ensure that he is able 
to perform at his highest level.158  Moreover, the mandatory meals allow 
the team to control the “players’ movement and conduct up until the 
game.”159  To accomplish this, the coaches take attendance at the meals 
to ensure that the players are present, “ready to participate in any 
meetings, and ready to head to the arena on time—or simply to ensure 
that the players are not absent shortly before a game.”160  Secondly, the 
pregame meals allow for coaches to hold meetings with individual 
players to ensure that they are all on the same page at the start of the 
game.161  It seems unlikely that the court would find that the Boston 
Bruins’ policies are not reasonably related to its business needs.  The only 
reason for these strict policies is to ensure that the team gives the fans a 
suitable product on game day.  Furthermore, there does not seem to be 
any evidence that the team does not follow its policies in the actual 
conduct of business.  In conclusion, the Boston Bruins have a bona fide 
policy in place that is strictly enforced, and thus the court should respect 
this business decision by the Boston Bruins and not substitute the team’s 
judgment with its own. 
 b. Business Premises of the Employer 
This section will provide a working definition of the term “business 
premises of the employer” under IRC Sections 274(e)(1), 132(e)(2), and 
119(a)(1).162  As discussed in section 4.B.1 of this note, the language of 
Section 119 was changed in the Senate from “furnished at the place of 
 
 157  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 158  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 159  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 160  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 161  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. 
 162  26 I.R.C. § 274(e)(1) (2016) (“Subsection (a) shall not apply to—Expenses for food 
and beverages . . . furnished on the business premises of the taxpayer primarily for his 
employees.”) (emphasis added); I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (“The operation by an employer of any 
eating facility for employees shall be treated as de minimis fringe if—(A) such facility is 
located on or near the business premises of the employer . . . .”) (emphasis added); I.R.C. § 
119(a) (“There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals 
or lodging furnished to him . . . by . . . his employer for the convenience of the employer, but 
only if—(1) . . . meals are furnished on the business premise of the employer . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
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employment” to “furnished on the business premise of the employer.”163  
Despite the change in the language, the Senate provided that business 
premise of the employer is “intended in general, to have the same effect 
as the term ‘place of employment.’”164  The Senate further clarified its 
position by providing an example of what would constitute the business 
premises of the employer.165 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to provide concrete factors 
for courts to consider in deciding whether property constitutes the 
business premises of the employer in Commissioner v. Kowalski.  The 
issue was whether the cash meal allowances provided to New Jersey state 
troopers should be included in the state troopers’ gross income, or 
whether the payment is excluded from the state troopers’ income by 
virtue of Section 119.166  State troopers, in this case, were provided meal 
allowances by their employer, enabling the troopers to be “on call” while 
they were on break.167  Moreover, the state troopers were not required to 
spend this money on food, and the amount of money they received for 
meals was determined by their rank.168  These factors led the court to hold 
in favor of the IRS, reasoning that the payments were part of the state 
troopers’ gross income and that Section 119 applies only to “meals or 
lodging furnished in kind.”169  Unfortunately, the Court did not address 
the question of whether the restaurants that the state troopers ate at satisfy 
the business premises requirement of Section 119.  However, in a dissent, 
Justice Blackmun asserted, “[T]he business premises of the State of New 
Jersey, the trooper’s employer, are wherever the trooper is on duty in that 
State. The employer’s premises are statewide.”170 
In deriving a working definition of “business premises of the 
employer,” the Sixth Circuit has applied a two-part test.  If the taxpayer 
meets either one of these elements, the property will be found to be the 
business premises of the employer.  The first element is a spatial test, 
which states that the business premise of the employer is “the premises 
where the employer conducts a significant portion of his business,” even 
 
 163  H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A39 (1954) (emphasis added); see H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543, 
at 26 (1954) (Conf. Rep.). 
 164  H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543, at 27 (1954) (Conf. Rep.). 
 165  Id. (“Meals furnished to a cowhand while herding his employer’s cattle on leased 
lands, or on national forest lands used under a permit, would also be regarded as furnished on 
the business premises of the employer.”). 
 166  Comm’r. v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 78 (1977). 
 167  Id. at 80. 
 168  Id. at 80-81. 
 169  Id. at 84 (citing S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 190 (1954)). 
 170  Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 97-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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if the employee does not perform any of his duties at this location.171  The 
second element is a functional test, which requires that meals or lodging 
be provided at “a place where the employee performs a significant portion 
of his duties,” even if it is not at the location where the employer conducts 
his business operations.172  The Tax Court has applied a “substantially 
similar” test for determining the business premises of the employer.  This 
test holds that the phrase “business premises of the employer” should be 
construed to mean either “(1) an integral part of the business property or 
(2) premises on which the company carries on some of its business 
activities.”173  A location will be considered an integral part of the 
business property if “physically located on the employer’s premises” or 
if the “employee does enough work for the employer” at the location that 
such location is “identified with the interest of the business and serve[s] 
important business functions.”174  Conversely, an area “physically located 
off the worksite [is] not integral to the employer’s business unless the 
employee does significant work for the employer or the employer 
conducts a significant portion of its business” in the area.175  Regardless 
of which version of the test is applied, the business premises of the 
employer is a factual question which considers “[t]he extent or 
boundaries of the business premises . . . whose resolution follows a 
consideration of the employee’s duties as well as the nature of the 
employer’s business.”176  Lastly, the employer’s ownership of the place 
where lodging is provided or where meals are furnished “is not intended 
by Congress to be the crucial test, nor even an essential element, of the 
meaning of ‘business premises.’”177 
           1. Spatial Business Premises 
This section of the note will analyze various court cases where the 
spatial location of the property was a determinative factor in deciding 
whether or not the property can be considered the business premises of 
the employer.  In Commissioner v. Anderson, an employer built a house 
for his motel manager that was only two blocks from the motel he 
managed.178  The manager was required to be available “twenty-four 
 
 171  Comm’r. v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 67 (6th Cir. 1966). 
 172  Id. 
 173  Benninghoff v. Comm’r., 71 T.C. 216, 220 (1978) (citing Dole v. Comm’r., 43 T.C. 
697, 707 (1965)). 
 174  Hargrove v. Comm’r., 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 90, at *4 (2006). 
 175  Id. 
 176  Van Huff v. Comm’r., 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, at *3-4 (1981). 
 177  Anderson, 371 F.2d at 64. 
 178  Id. at 61-62. 
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hours a day for the business of the motel.”179  Here the Court adopted the 
rule that “on the business premises of the employer” means that the meals 
or lodging must be furnished “at a place where the employee performs a 
significant portion of his duties or on the premises where the employer 
conducts a significant portion of his business.”180  In the end, the Court 
held that the house was not on the business premises of the employer.181  
It reasoned that “[t]o make ‘two short blocks’ or nearness to other 
business property of the employer the test is to disregard the word ‘on’ as 
contained in the phrase ‘on the business premises of the employer.’”182  
Furthermore, the Court stated that if Congress had intended “on the 
business premises of the employer” to mean “near,” it would have used 
words such as “‘in the vicinity of’ or ‘nearby’ or ‘close to’ or ‘contiguous 
to’ or similar language, rather than to say ‘on’ the business premises.”183 
Anderson is similar to Lindeman v. Commissioner such that in 
Lindeman, the petitioner was the manager of a hotel and, pursuant to his 
employment, his employer provided him with a home in a parking lot 
leased by the employer, which was across the street from the hotel.184  As 
manager of the hotel, the petitioner was required to be on call twenty-four 
hours a day.185  Moreover, the petitioner had a telephone in his home, 
which connected directly to the hotel, so that he could conduct business 
from home.186  The Court provided that in order for the petitioner’s home 
to constitute the business premises of his employer, the petitioner needed 
to show that the home was either (1) an “integral part of the business 
property or (2) premises on which the company carries on some of its 
business activities.”187  Applying this rule to the facts, the Court 
concluded that the petitioner’s home was part of the business premises of 
the employer, because the lot was owned by the employer.188 
In Winchell v. United States, the petitioner was hired as president of 
a college.189  The Board of Directors insisted that the petitioner move into 
a home owned by the school, which was located four miles from the main 
campus of the school.190  Moreover, the petitioner was permitted to live 
 
 179  Id. at 68. 
 180  Id. at 67. 
 181  Id.  
 182  Anderson, 371 F.2d at 67. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Lindeman v. Comm’r., 60 T.C. 609, 609-12 (1973). 
 185  Id. at 616. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. at 615. 
 188  Id. at 617. 
 189  Winchell v. U.S., 564 F. Supp. 131, 133 (1983). 
 190  Id. 
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in this home without having to pay rent to the school.191  Occasionally, 
the school used the petitioner’s residence for events such as outdoor 
classes, student picnics, athletic events, and “college commencement 
exercises.”192  The Court concluded that the housing provided by the 
school “is not geographically integrated with the business property of the 
College.”193  In addition, the Court noted that neither the petitioner nor 
his employer carried out a significant portion of their activities or duties 
at the residence.194 
The aforementioned cases were decided on the proximity of the 
property in relation to the business, which was an influential factor in the 
courts’ decisions because the petitioners could not establish that they 
performed a significant portion of their duties on the properties.  If the 
petitioners in the aforementioned cases established that they performed a 
significant portion of their duties on the properties, then they would have 
been able to make a “functional business premises” claim.  Moreover, the 
majority of courts seem to favor the idea that “functional rather than 
spatial unity is determinative” in deciding if an area constitutes part of 
the employer’s premises.195 
           2. Functional Business Premises 
In U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, the plaintiff 
was a nonprofit corporation, which set out to “promote and foster the 
growth of young men.”196  The plaintiff provided rent-free housing in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma to the president of the organization during his term.197  
During the year, the president spent half of his time traveling and the 
other half in Tulsa “directing Plaintiff’s various programs.”198  The house 
provided to the president included an office, which he used for 
“conducting staff meetings,” “briefings by subordinate officials,” and 
providing entertainment for the plaintiff’s business.199  The Court focused 
on where the duties of the employee were performed to determine the 
business premises of the employer.200  The Court concluded that “part of 
plaintiff’s official activities were carried out at the House which it 
 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id.  
 193  Id. at 136. 
 194  Id. at 136–37. 
 195  Bob Jones University v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 340, 355 (1982) (citing Adams v. United 
States, 218 Ct. Cl. 322, 332 (1978)). 
 196  U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce v. U.S., 167 Ct. Cl. 392, 394 (1964). 
 197  Id. at 395. 
 198  Id. at 395-96. 
 199  Id. at 396 
 200  Id. at 400. 
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owned” and therefore the residence constituted the business premises of 
the employer.201 
In Adams v. United States, the plaintiff was the president of Mobil 
Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaiasha.202  The plaintiff was provided rent-free living 
in a house located three miles from his business headquarters.203  The 
plaintiff’s company had a policy of providing its president with housing 
because, in Japan, the “effectiveness of a president of a company is 
influenced by the social standing.”204  The plaintiff regularly “worked in 
the house in the evenings and on weekends,” “held small meetings there 
for mixed business and social purposes,” provided business 
entertainment, and used the telephone in the house for business 
purposes.205  Focusing on the duties performed by the plaintiff, the Court 
held that the residence constituted the business premises of the 
employer.206 
An essential case to the Bruins’ argument is Mabley v. 
Commissioner.  The issue in this case was whether the petitioner may 
exclude from gross income, under Section 119, “the fair market value of 
meals furnished to him by his employer during that year.”207  During the 
1960 tax year, the Petitioner was the vice president of Island Creek Coal 
Company, which was located in the Chafin Building.208  The president of 
the company had a policy that he would hold “daily luncheon conferences 
with his staff,” which included the executive vice president, several vice 
presidents, and general counsel.209  These daily lunch meetings allowed 
the staff members to report on their various departments and disclose any 
new information that had arisen since the prior meeting, enabling the 
president and the staff to stay informed on the current day-to-day 
activities of the company.210  In order to effectuate the president’s lunch 
meeting policy, the company needed to provide meals to the staff; 
however, “there were no dining facilities in the Chafin Building, with the 
exception of a stand-up snack bar which would accommodate only a few 
people.”211 
The lack of dining facilities prompted the company to enter into a 
 
 201  Id. 
 202  Adams v. U.S., 218 Ct. Cl. 322, 324 (1978). 
 203  Id. at 325. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id. at 326. 
 206  Id. at 333-34. 
 207  Mabley v. C.I.R., 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784, at *1 (1965). 
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. 
 210  Id. at *2. 
 211  Id. 
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rental agreement with the owner of the Prichard Hotel, which was 
“located approximately one-half block from the Chafin Building.”212  
Pursuant to the agreement, the company paid the Prichard Hotel for a 
suite “suitable for dining purposes.”213  Furthermore, the rental agreement 
provided that the hotel would “provide the company meals from the hotel 
kitchen” during the meetings, which were served in the suite, and the 
meals would paid for by the company.214  Sometimes these daily lunch 
meetings were attended by “out-of-town business guests of the company” 
and occasionally “the suite was used to provide dinner for such guests.”215  
The petitioner in Mabley was determined by the IRS to have a deficiency 
in income because the gross income on the petitioner’s tax return omitted 
the fair market value of these daily meals.216  However, the Court held 
that, in light of the aforementioned facts, the leased hotel suite constituted 
the business premises of the employer.217  The Court reasoned that “the 
rented hotel suite in which the meals were furnished was acquired and 
actually used for the conduct of businesses of the company, the furnishing 
of the meals being merely incidental.”218  Thus, even though the hotel 
was not located on the business premises of the employer, the Court 
found that the employees conducted a significant amount of business at 
the hotel, which enabled it to be considered the business premises of the 
employer for Section 119 purposes. 
Lastly, in a Revenue Ruling, the IRS provided an example of when 
a location is considered a business premise of the employer by virtue of 
the employer performing substantial work at the location.219  The 
situation presented to the IRS involved a bank that had several branch 
offices and a main office in a city.220  The main office and some of the 
branch offices furnished meals free of charge to the employees of the 
company.221  However, some of the branches did not have an eating 
facility, which caused the employees of those branches to go to the main 
office or one of the other branches that had a dining facility for lunch.  
The IRS held that the employees who “work in a branch office having no 
 
 212  Id. at *1 (The Prichard Hotel was “the nearest hotel that had dining facilities.”). 
 213  Mabley v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1794 (1965). 
 214  Id. at *2 (“At daily luncheons conferences each staff member ordered from the regular 
hotel menu.”). 
 215  Id. at *2 (stating that there were also times where a business meeting would occur in 
the suite and no meals were served). 
 216  Id. at *2. 
 217  Id. at *3. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Rev. Rul. 77-411, 1971-2 C.B. 103. 
 220  Id. 
 221  Id. 
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eating facilities but who go to a branch that has eating facilities are 
considered to have received their meals on the premises of their 
employer,” because “a significant portion of the employer’s business is 
carried on at the place where the employees receive the meals.”222 
Under the functional view, the courts have varied in the amount of 
work that needs to be conducted by the employer or the employee in order 
to convert a property into the business premises of the employer.  In 
Adams, the Court required that there be “some substantial segment” of 
business activity to have the property be classified as the business 
premises of the employer.223  Other courts, such as the one in Anderson, 
require that a “significant portion” of the employer’s or employee’s duties 
occur at a location in order to convert that location into the business 
premises of the employer.224  However, a few courts, such as the court in 
Dole v. Commissioner, require that only “some” business activities occur 
on the property in order for a property to be considered the business 
premises of the employer.225 
           3. Business Premises of the Boston Bruins 
As previously discussed, the business premises of the employer is 
either “the premises where the employer conducts a significant portion of 
his business,” even if the employee does not perform any of his duties at 
this location, or “a place where the employee performs a significant 
portion of his duties,” even if it is not at the location where the employer 
conducts his business operations.226  Moreover, “functional rather than 
spatial unity is determinative” in deciding if an area constitutes the 
employer’s premises.227 
The Boston Bruins will be able to satisfy either one of these tests 
when the team travels for away games.  With respect to the premises 
where the employee performs a significant amount of his duties, the 
Boston Bruins’ players perform a significant amount of their duties at the 
hotel in the away city.  During the players’ stay at the hotel, they are 
required to attend meetings where they “go over the game plan” and 
watch film on their opponent.228  If players miss any of these meetings or 
if they miss a curfew, the team reserves the right to fine the players for 
 
 222  Id. 
 223  Adams v. U.S., 218 Ct. Cl., 332, 332 (1978). 
 224  Comm’r. v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 65 (6th Cir. 1966). 
 225  Dole v. Comm’r., 43 T.C. 697, 707 (1965). 
 226  Anderson, 371 F.2d at 67. 
 227  Bob Jones University v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 340, 355 (1982). 
 228  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7. 
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failure to abide by the team’s rules.229  The time the players spend 
preparing for the games in the hotel “is substantial, and far greater than 
the 60 minutes of ice time that each away game requires.”230  
Furthermore, the players receive all necessary medical treatment and 
physical therapy while staying at the hotel.231  An analogous situation to 
the Boston Bruins’ case is provided by the legislative history of IRC 
Section 119: the Senate provided that “meals furnished to a cowhand 
while herding his employer’s cattle on leased lands, or on national forest 
lands used under a permit, would also be regarded as furnished on the 
business premises of the employer.”232  Essentially, the players are the 
cowhands and the hotel is the land leased, pursuant to a short-time lease, 
by their employer.  This example provided by the legislative history 
makes it clear that the Boston Bruins should be able to exclude its players’ 
meals from its gross income. 
In regards to the second test where the business premises is the 
property where the employer performs a significant amount of his 
business, the Boston Bruins will be able to satisfy this test.  When 
traveling to an away city, the Boston Bruins set up a “base of operations 
at a local hotel.”233  This hotel is used extensively by the team to further 
its business purposes.234  For instance, the team requires the hotel to 
provide “private meeting rooms,” “eating facilities,” and “space for 
physical therapy and medical treatment.”235  The Boston Bruins’ situation 
is similar to that in Mabley. Both Mabley and the Boston Bruins conduct 
business at a hotel, which is leased or rented by the company.236  
Furthermore, in both of these cases, the location of the property where 
the business meeting is held is not at the main headquarters of the 
company.237  The only difference between these two cases is the amount 
of time that the company has rights to the property and the distance of the 
property with respect to the headquarters of the business.238  In Mabley, 
the hotel where the business meetings were held was only one and a half 
 
 229  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6. 
 230  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7. 
 231  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6. 
 232  H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543, at 26 (1954) (Conf. Rep.). 
 233  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6. 
 234  Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 235  Br. For Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 236  See generally Mabley v. Comm’r., 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784 (1965); see also Br. for 
Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 237  See generally Mabley, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784 (1965); see also Br. for Pet’r, supra 
note 1, at 6-7. 
 238  See generally Mabley, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784 (1965); see generally Br. for Pet’r, 
supra note 1. 
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blocks from the offices of the company, and the company used the hotel 
on a daily basis.239  But the location of the Boston Bruins’ hotel could be 
anywhere where there is a professional hockey team, and the team will 
likely stay at the hotel for a only few days.  However, the distance of the 
property from the main offices should not matter because “functional 
rather than spatial unity is determinative” in deciding if an area 
constitutes the employer’s premises.240  Additionally, the amount of time 
that a property has to be used by the employer or employee has not been 
considered a determinative factor for the business premises test.  In light 
of the aforementioned, the Boston Bruins will be able to establish that the 
hotel is functionally its business premise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Boston Bruins should be entitled to deduct 100 percent of the 
away game meal expenses that the team incurs.  As mentioned above, the 
team is able to satisfy all the requirements of Tax Code Sections 162, 274, 
and 132.  The most difficult issue for the team is establishing that the 
away city hotel constitutes its business premises.  However, the 
legislative history and case law strongly indicate that the team will be 
able to meet this burden. 
The implications of the Boston Bruins winning this case are 
immense.  If the court finds in favor of the Boston Bruins, the IRS will 
lose out on millions of dollars from all major sports teams in the United 
States.  A favorable ruling for the Boston Bruins would essentially 
encourage professional sports teams to provide their players with meals 
during away games because the teams would be able to fully deduct the 
amount spent on the meals.  Moreover, the IRS risks losing tax revenue 
from “industries involving mobile employers” because those industries 
will use this case as precedent.241 
 
 
 239  Mabley, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784, at *1-2 (1965). 
 240  Bob Jones University v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 340, 355 (1982). 
 241  Velarde, supra note 7. 
